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Note
Partial-Birth Infanticide: An Alternate Legal and
Medical Route to Banning Partial-Birth Procedures
Jill R. Radloff*
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade,' the
American political and legal scene has been sharply divided
over the legality of abortions.2 The debate has become even
more graphic and disturbing in the last few years as Congress
and many state legislatures have proposed and often passed
partial-birth abortion ban statutes.3 These statutes seek to ban
* J.D. Candidate 2000, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1997,
Northwestern College of Iowa. I would like to thank Professor Michael Stokes
Paulsen for presenting me with this topic and Nicole Terpstra and Tracey
Holmes for their friendship and encouragement.
1. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that the right to privacy includes a
woman's decision to have an abortion).
2. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (plu-
rality opinion) (acknowledging that the issue of legalizing abortion continues
to be at least as divisive as it was in 1973 when Roe v. Wade was handed
down); ABORTION, MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 9 (Jay L. Garfield &
Patricia Hennessey eds., 1984) (characterizing the legal status of abortion as
one of the most divisive social issues facing the American public).
3. The United States Congress first passed a partial-birth abortion ban
statute in 1995. See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995, H.R. 1833, 104th
Cong. (1995). President Clinton vetoed the Act on April 10, 1996 because itlacked an exception for women who faced serious health consequences. See
Ann Devroy, Late-Term Abortion Ban Vetoed; 'Small but Vulnerable' Group of
Women Needs Procedure, Clinton Says, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1996, at Al. The
House overrode President Clinton's veto, but the Senate lacked nine votes of
the two-thirds majority required to override the veto. See CONG. REC.
H10642, roll call #422 (votes: 285-137) (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1996); CONG. REC.
S11337-61, roll call #301 (votes: 57-41) (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1996); Helen Dewar,
Senate Sustains Clinton Veto of Late-Term Abortion Ban, WASH. POST, Sept.
27, 1996, at A4. A similar act was introduced in 1997. See Partial-Birth Abor-
tion Ban Act of 1997, H.R. 1122, 105th Cong. (1997). This time the Senate fell
only three votes short of overriding President Clinton's veto. See CONG. REC.
S10551-64, roll call #277 (votes: 64-36) (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1998); Senate Over-
ride Fails on Abortion Measure; Effort to Block Clinton Veto Falls, 64-36,
WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1998, at A8.
In addition, state legislatures vigorously have been enacting partial-birth
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a particular abortion procedure in which a hole is made in the
skull of the fetus and the brains are extracted so that the fe-
tus's head can be compressed, permitting the fetus to be re-
moved intact.4 Given the graphic nature of the procedure, it is
not surprising that many have compared it to a form of infanti-
cide.5 Yet, despite what appears to be a thin line between par-
tial-birth abortions and infanticide, where partial-birth abor-
tion bans have been challenged in court, the analysis has
focused solely on whether the bans can be upheld under the
Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence.6
In November of 1998, voters in Washington State were
presented with Ballot Initiative 694.7 Although Initiative 694
abortion ban statutes. Currently, 28 states have enacted partial-birth abor-
tion ban statutes. See infra notes 37-38 (listing the state statutes). In fact,
only four state legislatures (Nevada, North Dakota, Texas and Pennsylvania)
have not introduced any partial-birth abortion ban statute in the last three
years. See James Bopp, Jr. & Curtis R. Cook, Partial-Birth Abortion: The Fi-
nal Frontier of Abortion Jurisprudence, 14 ISSUEs L. & MED., Summer 1998,
at 3, 4 n.2 (listing the states that have passed and proposed partial-birth abor-
tion bans). Texas, however, has a long-standing statute that criminalizes the
kgillin of "a child in a state of being born and before actual birth." See TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4512.5 (West 1976) ("Whoever shall during parturi-
tion of the mother destroy the vitality or life in a child in a state of being born
and before actual birth, which child would otherwise have been born alive,
shall be confined in the penitentiary for life or for not less than five years.");
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 117 n.1 (noting that although Article 4512.5 was part
of the Texas chapter challenged as unconstitutional, this specific article was
not under attack).
4. See The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R.
1833 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 5-12 (1995)
[hereinafter Senate Hearings] (publishing Dr. Martin Haskell's 1992 presenta-
tion at a National Abortion Federation seminar that first introduced the pro-
cedure); see also infra notes 20-29 and accompanying text (describing partial-
birth abortion procedures in more detail).
5. See House Overrides Veto by Clinton of a Ban on Late Abortions, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 20, 1996, at Al (recognizing that even some abortion rights sup-
porters find partial-birth abortions uncomfortably close to infanticide); see also
Nat Hentoff, 'Close to Infanticide', WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1996, at A31 (recog-
nizing that in most cases the fetus is still alive when scissors are inserted into
the base of its skull and the brains are sucked out).
6. See infra Part I.C (describing decisions by lower courts on the consti-
tutionality of partial-birth abortion ban statutes).
7. Initiative Measure No. 694-Partial-Birth Abortions, WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. tit. 9, ch. 9.02 (West Supp. 1998) [hereinafter Initiative 694]. Ini-
tiative 694 was rejected at the polls. See Hunter George, Medicinal Marijuana
Measure Approved; Abortion Rejected, COLUMBIAN, Nov. 4, 1998, at B2 (de-
scribing the rejection of Initiative 694 by a measure of 57% to 43%). It is not
surprising that Washington voters refused to adopt Initiative 694-ballot
measures upholding abortion rights previously had been passed three times,
and "Washington state voters have long been pro-choice." See Lynne K
1556 [Vol. 83:1555
PARTIAL-BIRTH INFANTICIDE
shared the same objective as partial-birth abortion bans in
other states, Initiative 694 was the first state proposal that
sought to ban partial-birth procedures as a form of infanticide. 8
Specifically, the Initiative defined the process of birth and
banned the killing of an infant in the process of birth as infan-
ticide.9 By concluding that during a partial-birth procedure the
child dies during the birth process and not within the uterus,
Initiative 694 claimed that it was not regulating abortion but
instead proscribing infanticide. 10 Although Washington voters
rejected the Initiative, its unique approach could serve as a
model for other state legislatures and possibly for Congress as
they draft new partial-birth procedure bans." Moreover, the
definitional approach of the birth process taken by Initiative
694 represents a potentially huge turning point in abortion ju-
risprudence.' 2
This Note examines whether the infanticide distinction
drawn by partial-birth infanticide bans like Initiative 694 is
medically accurate and whether partial-birth infanticide can be
constitutionally banned. Part I describes partial-birth proce-
dures, discusses the Supreme Court's historical abortion juris-
prudence and recent court decisions on the constitutionality of
partial-birth abortion bans, and details the unique characteris-
tics of Initiative 694. Part H explores the medical definitions of
the birth process and whether a distinction can be made be-
tween abortion and infanticide. Part Ill argues that bans
similar to Initiative 694 would be constitutional because they
would ban partial-birth infanticide, not abortion, and high-
lights the benefits of the infanticide approach versus the abor-
tion approach of partial-birth procedure bans. Finally, this
Note concludes that partial-birth infanticide bans like Initia-
tive 694 are not only constitutional, but should also serve as a
model for states whose partial-birth abortion ban statutes have
been enjoined and for those states who are just enacting par-
tial-birth procedure bans.
Varner, Ban on Late-Term Abortions Defeated, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 4, 1998,
at B2.
8. Compare infra notes 37-39 (describing other states' partial-birth abor-
tion bans), with infra notes 74-81 (describing Initiative 694).
9. See Initiative 694 §§ 1-2.
10. See id. §§ 1(8), 2(3).
IL See infra Part I.B (discussing the benefits of a partial-birth infanti-
cide statute in comparison to a partial-birth abortion statute).
12. See infra notes 165-171 and accompanying text.
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I. THE ABORTION ROADBLOCK
A. DEFINING A PARTIAL-BIRTH PROCEDURE
Partial-birth abortion is not a medical term, but a descrip-
tion that developed in conjunction with the legislative efforts to
ban a particular abortion method.' 3 The medical community
recognizes six abortion procedures: suction curettage, 14 dilation
and evacuation (D & E),I5 dilation and extraction (D & X),16 in-
13. See Planned Parenthood v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369, 1376 (D. Ariz.
1997) (noting that "partial-birth abortion" is not a medical term recognized in
obstetrics or gynecology); Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283, 1297 (E.D. Mich.
1997) (stating that all doctors testifying at the court hearing agreed that "par-
tial-birth abortion" is not a medical term); Ann MacLean Massie, So-Called
"Partial-Birth Abortion" Bans: Bad Medicine? Maybe. Bad Law? Definitely!, 59
U. PITT. L. REV. 301, 313 (1998) (stating that the term "partial-birth abortion"
does not exist in medical terminology or literature). But see Richmond Med.
Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326, 327 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding that
both the American Medical Association (AMA) and the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) recognize the term "partial-birth
abortion").
14. The most common first trimester abortion procedure is suction curet-
tage, also known as suction aspiration. See Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp.
2d 1099, 1102 (D. Neb. 1998) (referring to an AMA report stating that suction
curettage is the most common abortion procedure from the sixth to twelfth
week of gestation, but is often utilized up to the fifteenth week). This proce-
dure entails dilation of the cervix so that a suction tube can be inserted into
the uterus and the fetus removed with suction. See Planned Parenthood v.
Doyle, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1036 (W.D. Wis. 1998), rev'd, 162 F.3d 463 (7th Cir.
1998); Evans, 977 F. Supp. at 1292.
15. See Women's Med. Profl Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 198 (6th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1347 (1998) (describing a conventional D &
E procedure); Evans, 977 F. Supp. at 1293 (describing the steps taken to per-
form a D & E abortion). The first step of a D & E abortion is overnight dila-
tion of the cervix using laminaria, which are osmotic dilators that absorb
natural moisture and expand to dilate the cervix. See Planned Parenthood v.
Miller, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1161 (S.D. Iowa 1998). The following day the
physician removes the laminaria and begins to evacuate the uterus by a com-
bination of vacuum suction cannulas, suction curettes, or forceps. See Doyle, 9
F. Supp. 2d at 1036. The physician then intentionally dismembers the fetus in
order to remove it more easily from the uterus. See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at
198; Carhart, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1103-04 (recognizing that at this stage of de-
velopment the fetus is larger and the bones are more rigid, making dismem-
berment necessary for the fetus to be safely removed). For a medical textbook
description of abortion procedures, see generally WARREN M. HERN, ABORTION
PRACTICE 108-56 (1984). D & E abortions are the most common method of
second trimester abortions. See Carhart, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1103 (citing an
AMA report showing that D & E abortions are the most common procedure for
abortions performed between 13 and 15 weeks of gestation); Evans, 977 F.
Supp. at 1293 (noting that "the D & E procedure is the preferred method for
second trimester abortions"). D & E abortions normally are performed after
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duction, 17 hysterotomy, 8 and hysterectomy. 19 The procedure
most commonly equated with partial-birth abortion is the
D & X procedure,20 which is also known as the intact dilation
and evacuation (intact D & E).21 A D & X procedure is a varia-
tion of the D & E procedure.22 The D & X procedure differs
13 weeks, but not frequently after 20 weeks. See id.
16. See infra notes 20-26 (describing the D & X procedure); see also infra
notes 114-122 and accompanying text (analyzing why a D & X procedure is not
characterized properly as an abortion procedure).
17. In an induction procedure, a hypertonic solution of saline, urea, or
prostaglandin is infused into the amniotic cavity. See Carhart v. Stenberg,
972 F. Supp. 507, 516-17 (D. Neb. 1997); HERN, supra note 15, at 125-26. This
solution "causes fetal demise and induces uterine contractions." Carhart, 972
F. Supp. at 517. Induction abortions are performed only in the second or third
trimester. See Evans, 977 F. Supp. at 1293-95 (stating that an induction abor-
tion cannot be accomplished successfully at 13 to 16 weeks of gestation).
18. A hysterotomy is essentially a pre-term Cesarean section. See Doyle, 9
F. Supp. 2d at 1037.
19. A hysterectomy entails the surgical removal of the woman's uterus.
See Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 995 F. Supp. 847, 853 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
20. See, e.g., Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326,
327 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating that partial-birth abortion is otherwise known as
an intact D & X in the medical community); Eubanks v. Stengel, 28 F. Supp.
2d 1024, 1028 (W.D. Ky. 1998) (stating that a partial-birth abortion procedure
is known in medical circles as a D & X procedure). Dr. Martin Haskell was the
first to coin this title for the procedure. See supra note 4 (noting that Dr.
Haskell developed the procedure).
2L See, e.g., Eubanks, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1028 (noting that D & X and in-
tact D & E are alternate terms for the same procedure); Planned Parenthood
v. Doyle, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1036 (W.D. Wis. 1998) (noting that the intact D
& E is synonymous with D & X or intact D & X), rev'd, 162 F.3d 463 (7th Cir.
1998). Dr. James McMahon, who specialized in late-term abortions, used the
term intact D & E to describe the procedure that he performed. See Roy
Rivenburg, Partial Truths in the PR War over a Form of Late-Term Abortions,
Both Sides Are Guilty of Manipulating the Facts. Here's What They Are (and
Aren't) Saying, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 2, 1997, at El. Haskell's and McMahon's pro-
cedures are virtually identical, making the terms equivalent.
22. See Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1105 (D. Neb. 1998) (de-
scribing a D & X procedure as a form of D & E abortion); Doyle, 9 F. Supp. 2d
at 1036 (noting that the D & X is a variant of the conventional D & E); Rich-
mond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d 795, 803 (E.D. Va. 1998)
("As a general proposition, D & X is a variant of D & E but 'differs from classic
D & E in that it [D & X does not rely upon dismemberment to remove the fe-
tus.'). The D & X procedure is assumed to be utilized most commonly in late
second trimester abortions after twenty weeks. See Carhart, 11 F. Supp. 2d at
1105-06 (recognizing that only at approximately 20 weeks gestation is the fe-
tus developed enough to be removed intact, but that at this stage the head is
too large to be removed without either crushing or compressing it); Senate
Hearings, supra note 4, at 6 (reprinting Dr. Haskell's presentation in which he
stated that he "routinely performs this procedure on all patients 20 through 24
weeks"). Even though the D & X procedure may be the most common late-
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from the D & E method because the physician attempts to re-
move the fetus from the uterus in an intact state, rather than
dismembering and removing parts of the fetus.23 To remove an
intact fetus from the uterus in a D & X procedure, the doctor
uses instruments to grasp onto a lower extremity of the fetus
and pull the lower extremities and torso into the vagina.24 The
doctor proceeds to poke a pair of blunt scissors into the base of
the skull and spread them open so that a suction catheter may
be inserted and the skull contents removed because in most
cases the fetal skull is too large to be delivered.25 Once the
skull contents are extracted and the skull compressed, the child
is delivered completely out of the uterus and the vagina.26
Although the above process describes the steps normally
taken to perform a D & X procedure, doctors throughout the
term abortion procedure, there still is much dispute over the actual number of
D & X procedures performed in the United States. See Massie, supra note 13,
at 318-19 (recognizing that the initial statistic of only several hundred D & X
procedures performed yearly is likely inaccurate, but that even the more accu-
rate estimate of several thousand D & X procedures is small in comparison to
the 1.5 million abortions performed annually); Bopp & Cook, supra note 3, at
13 (stating that the head of the National Coalition of Abortion Providers now
estimates that between 3000 and 5000 partial-birth abortions are performed
annually).
23. See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 199 (noting that the primary distinguishing
characteristic of a D & X procedure is that it "results in a relatively intact fe-
tus"); DoyLe, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1036 (same); cf. supra note 15. In addition, the D
& X procedure differs from the D & E procedure because there is often an ad-
ditional day of dilation of the cervix prior to the procedure. See Voinovich, 130
F.3d at 198-99. The additional day of dilation is needed because the D & X
procedure normally is done only in late second trimester abortions when the
fetus is larger and more developed. See id.
24. See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 199 (describing how a physician uses ultra-
sound guidance to grasp a lower extremity and pull the other lower extremi-
ties, torso, shoulders, and arms into the vagina); Carhart, 11 F. Supp. 2d at
1106 (stating that the fetus is pulled into the vaginal cavity except for the
head, which remains "lodged in the uterine side of the cervical canal").
25. See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 199 (describing use of scissors and a suc-
tion cannula to decompress the fetal head); Carhart, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1106
(describing use of an instrument to either perforate or tear the skull in order
for a cannula to be inserted and cranial contents removed); Hope Clinic v.
Ryan, 995 F. Supp. 847, 852 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (stating that in late second-
trimester abortions the head is too large to pass through the cervix and either
must be decompressed or evacuated); Evans, 977 F. Supp. at 1293 (describing
methods for reducing the size of the head by either collapsing it or evacuating
its contents).
26. See Ryan, 995 F. Supp. at 852 (describing the breech delivery of an
intact fetus after the decompression of the fetal skull); Evans, 977 F. Supp. at
1293 (describing removal of an intact fetus after evacuation of the cranium).
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country have developed their own variations to the procedure. 27
Therefore, a statute defining the D & X procedure step-by-step
and banning the procedure directly could easily be circum-
vented.28 Thus, in order to encompass all of the variations and
prevent circumvention of the ban, most legislatures have relied
on a general description of the process and the general term
partial-birth procedure rather than a direct ban of the D & X
procedure. 29
B. PROCEDURAL BANS iN SUPREME COURT ABORTION
JURISPRUDENCE
In 1973, the Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade that a
woman had a constitutional right to end her pregnancy with an
abortion during the first trimester and that during the second
trimester the state could only regulate abortions in ways rea-
sonably related to a woman's health.30 The Supreme Court
abandoned the original trimester framework in 1992 with its
plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.3 1 Casey es-
27. See Carhart, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1105-06 (noting that the physician-
plaintiff in the case did not adhere to the ACOG-defined D & X procedures be-
cause he did not manipulate the fetus to breech position).
28. See Bopp & Cook, supra note 3, at 23-25 (detailing how the ACOG de-
scription of the D & X method would not encompass commonly used variations
in the procedure). Specifically, if a statute banned the D & X procedure as de-
fined by the ACOG and the doctor completely evacuated the intracranial con-
tents, the statute would not be violated because the ACOG definition calls for
partial rather than complete evacuation of intracranial contents. See id. at 23.
The ACOG definition is also defective in stating that the evacuation of intra-
cranial contents is performed on a "living fetus" because in most cases the fe-
tus is no longer living once the scissors are thrust into the base of the skull;
the brain contents are evacuated from a dead fetus. See id. at 24. In addition,
a doctor could circumvent a partial-birth abortion ban patterned after the
ACOG definition by not turning the fetus into the breech position or by cutting
off a limb of the fetus so that the fetus no longer would be wholly "intact." See
id. at 24-25.
29. See infra note 38 and accompanying text; see also Richmond Med. Ctr.
for Women v. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d 795, 814 (E.D. Va. 1998) (noting that
the state argued that if the ban had defined the procedure with reference to
the descriptions of the D & X method provided by the AMA and ACOG, "the
providers of abortion would have made fine adjustments to their conduct so as
to avoid falling within the statutory proscription"); Planned Parenthood v.
Doyle, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1042 (W.D. Wis. 1998) (finding that the rejected
amendment to the Wisconsin statute, which would have listed a seven-step
definition of a partial-birth procedure, likely was rejected because it "could
have been easily avoided with non-traditional means of killing"), rev'd, 162
F.3d 463 (7th Cir. 1998).
30. 410 U.S. 113, 164(1973)
31. 505 U.S. 833, 870-72 (1992) (plurality opinion) (rejecting the trimester
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tablished the undue burden test as the method for determining
whether a state law restricting pre-viability abortions is consti-
tutional 32 and reaffirmed the state's power to restrict post-
viability abortions if the law contained exceptions for pregnan-
cies that endangered the woman's life or health.33
In its twenty-six year history of abortion jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court only once has considered the constitutionality
of banning a specific abortion procedure. In Planned Parent-
hood v. Danforth,34 the Supreme Court found unconstitutional
a Missouri law which prohibited the use of saline amniocentesis
because it would have banned one of the most common and saf-
est second trimester abortion procedures. 3 5
C. PARTIAL-BRTH ABORTION BANS
State statutes, like the proposed federal statutes, have
sought to ban partial-birth abortions by defining a partial-birth
abortion in terms of the procedural steps a physician takes to
perform the abortion.36 Some states have specifically sought to
framework of Roe and replacing it with a line drawn at viability so that before
the fetus reaches viability the woman may choose to terminate her preg-
nancy).
32. See id. at 875-77 (finding that state regulations that impose an undue
burden on a woman's ability to choose to abort a nonviable fetus are unconsti-
tutional and determining that an undue burden exists when "a state regula-
tion has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus").
33. See id. at 879.
34. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
35. See id. at 75-79. At the time Missouri's ban on saline amniocentesis
abortions was enacted, the procedure was used in 70% of all abortions per-
formed after the first trimester. See id. at 76. Saline amniocentesis also was
safer than carrying the child to term or than the alternative abortion proce-
dures of a hysterectomy or hysterotomy. See id. at 77. The Court found that
although prostaglandin injection was safer than saline amniocentesis, it was
still in its experimental stage and was not readily available in Missouri. See
id. Thus, the Court concluded that because the ban on saline amniocentesis
had the effect of forcing a woman to "terminate her pregnancy by methods
more dangerous to her health than the method outlawed" the ban was not rea-
sonably related to the protection of maternal health. See id. at 79. It should
be noted that Danforth was decided prior to the formulation of Casey's undue
burden test, which places an increased emphasis on the state's interest in fetal
life. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877; Danforth, 428 U.S. at 76 (applying Roe's sec-
ond trimester test); see also Bopp & Cook, supra note 3, at 42 (arguing that a
partial-birth abortion ban passes the stricter standards applied in Danforth
and thus necessarily would be constitutional "[ulnder the less stringent stan-
dards of Casey").
36. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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ban the D & X and intact D & E procedures. 37 The majority of
states enacting these bans,38 however, have followed the ap-
proach taken by Congress, which would have banned all proce-
dures "in which the person performing the abortion partially
vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the infant and
completing the delivery."39
In 1995, Ohio was the first state to attempt to ban partial-
birth abortions. 40 It sought to do so by specifically criminaliz-
ing performance of the D & X procedure.41 Dr. Haskell and his
37. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6721 (Supp. 1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2919.15 (Anderson Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310.5 (Supp. 1998).
Kansas's statute was challenged in Kansas state court, but the Kansas Su-
preme Court dismissed the suit because there had been no charges filed
against the doctor challenging the law. See John A. Dvorak, Abortion Doctor
Loses One, Wins One, KAN. CITY STAR, Oct. 1, 1998, at C1. The Sixth Circuit
found Ohio's statute to be unconstitutional. See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v.
Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1347 (1998);
infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. The constitutionality of Utah's
statute has not been challenged, but it likely would not fall to the arguments
made by the Sixth Circuit because its ban does not include D & E procedures.
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310.5(1)(a).
38. Twenty-five states have passed partial-birth abortion ban laws that
either mirror or heavily borrow from the proposed federal act. See ALA. CODE
§ 26-23-1 to -6 (Supp. 1998); ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.050 (Michie 1998); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.01 (West Supp. 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-61-201
to -204 (Michie 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 390.011, .0111 (West 1998); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-12-144 (Supp. 1998); 1998 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 34, HB 576,
54th Legis., 2nd Reg. Sess. (enacted); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 513/1, 5, 10,
15, 20, 99 (West Supp. 1998); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-34-2-1, 7 (Michie Supp.
1998); 1998 S. File 2073, 77th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Iowa) (enacted); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 311.720, .990 (Michie 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14"32.9,
40:1299.35.16 (West Supp. 1998); MICH. COmP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.17016,
.17516 (West Supp. 1998); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-71, 73 (Supp. 1998);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-401 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-326, 328
(Michie Supp. 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A.65A-5 to -7 (West Supp. 1998);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 684 (West Supp. 1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.12-1
to -6 (Supp. 1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-85 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1998); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-23A-28 to -32 (Michie Supp. 1998); TENN. CODE. ANN. §
39-15-209 (1997); VA. CODE. ANN. § 18.2-74.2 (Michie Supp. 1998); W. VA.
CODE § 33-42-3 (Supp. 1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 895.038, 940.16 (West Supp.
1998).
39. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1997, H.R. 929, 105th Cong. (1997);
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995, H.R. 1833, 104th Cong. (1995).
40. It is not surprising that Ohio was the first state to enact such legisla-
tion. Dr. Haskell, the originator of the D & X procedure, is from Ohio. See su-
pra n6tes 4, 20 and accompanying text (describing Dr. Haskell's development
of the D & X procedure).
41. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.15 (Anderson 1998). The statute
defined dilation and extraction as "the termination of a human pregnancy by
purposely inserting a suction device into the skull of a fetus to remove the
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clinic challenged the act, and a district court in Ohio deter-
mined that the statute was unconstitutional. 42 Upon appeal,
the Sixth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the language of the
Ohio act was vague and could be interpreted to include both the
D & X procedure and the D & E procedure. 43 After determining
that the Ohio statute included both procedures, the Sixth Cir-
cuit analyzed the constitutionality of the ban as applied to pre-
viability abortions under Casey's undue burden test.44 Relying
upon the Supreme Court's decision in Danforth, the panel con-
cluded that because the statute banned "the most commonly
used second trimester procedure," it imposed an unconstitu-
tional burden on a woman's right to choose to have an abor-
tion.45
Unlike the Ohio statute, most state partial-birth abortion
ban statutes are more general, banning all abortion procedures
in which a living fetus is partially delivered and then killed be-
fore the delivery is complete. 46 In addition to the general ban,
brain." § 2919.15(A). The statute also specifically exempted suction curettage
abortion procedures. See id. The statute specified that a violation of the stat-
ute was a fourth degree felony. See id. § 2919.15(D).
42 See Women's Med. Profl Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D.
Ohio 1995), affd, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1347
(1998). The district court listed three bases for its determination that the
Ohio statute was unconstitutional. First, the act was unconstitutionally vague
because it could be read to include D & E abortions. See id. at 1063-67. Sec-
ond, because the D & X procedure is potentially safer than other abortion pro-
cedures, banning the procedure would be an undue burden on a woman's abil-
ity to choose to have an abortion. See id. at 1067-71. Third, the ban did not
serve the State's purpose of preventing unnecessary cruelty to the human fe-
tus. See id. at 1071-75.
43. See Women's Med. Profl Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 199 (6th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1347 (1998). The court found Ohio's statute
vague as to whether it included D & E abortions because it specifically ex-
empted suction curettage abortions but not D & E abortions. See supra note
41. The Sixth Circuit, however, did not rely upon the district court's conclu-
sion that the D & X procedure was safer than other procedures or that the ban
did not serve the state's purpose of preventing unnecessary cruelty to the hu-
man fetus. See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 198.
44. See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 200-01 (finding that a ban of both the D &
X procedure and D & E abortions is an undue burden on a woman seeking an
abortion prior to viability of the fetus).
45. See id. at 201 (finding that the definition of the banned procedure in-
cluded D & E abortions, which are the most common method of abortion in the
second trimester); see also supra note 15. The court then failed to reach the
question of the constitutionality of the ban as applied to post-viability abor-
tions because it determined that that portion of the act could not be severed.
See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 202.
46. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (quoting the language of the
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some states have adopted the scienter provision amendment
proposed by the United States Senate in the passage of the
1997 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act.4 7 The scienter provision
defines vaginal delivery as "deliberately and intentionally de-
liver[ing] into the vagina a living fetus, or a substantial portion
thereof, for the purpose of performing a procedure the physi-
cian knows will kill the fetus, and kills the fetus."48
Courts have enjoined enforcement of the bans that follow
the proposed federal statute in the majority of states where
they have been challenged. 49 These courts have found the lan-
federal act that these general bans mirror). These bans differ from the Ohio
statute in that they do not use the medical descriptions of the abortion proce-
dures to ban specific procedures. The use of a broad layman's term is prefer-
able in some respects to the medical descriptions because it is more likely to be
interpreted to include slight variations in the procedures which do not follow
the exact steps of the medically defined procedures. See supra notes 27-29 and
accompanying text.
47. See H.R. 1122, 105th Cong. § 2(b)(3) (1997). See, e.g., 1998 Idaho Sess.
Laws ch. 34, H.B. 576, 54th Legis., 2nd Reg. Sess. (enacted); 1998 S. File 2073,
77th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (Iowa) (enacted); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.720,
.990 (Michie 1998); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-326, -328 (Michie Supp. 1998);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A.65A-5 to -7 (West Supp. 1998); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 684 (West Supp. 1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.12-1 to -6 (Supp. 1997);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-209 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74.2 (Michie
Supp. 1997); W. VA. CODE § 33-42-3 (Supp. 1998). Montana's statute varies
the intent requirement only slightly by requiring that the partial-birth abor-
tion procedure be performed "purposely, knowingly, or negligently." MONT.
CODE ANN. § 50-20-401 (1997). The Wisconsin statute requires that the par-
tial-birth abortion procedure be performed "with the intent to kill the child."
WIS. STAT. § 940.16 (West Supp. 1998). Louisiana's intent provision is
uniquely worded, banning any abortion procedure "whereby a living fetus or
infant is partially delivered or removed from the female's uterus by vaginal
means and with specific intent to kill or do great bodily harm is then killed
prior to complete delivery or removal." LA. REV. STAT. §§ 14:32.9,
40:1299.35.16 (West Supp. 1998).
48. H.R. 1122, 105th Cong. § 2(b)(3) (1997); see also 143 CONG. REC.
S4694-95 (daily ed. May 20, 1997) (statement of Sen. Santorum) (stating that
the amendment "tighten[s] up the language" and adds a mens rea element
satisfying the vagueness concerns voiced on the House and Senate floors).
49. Courts have enjoined enforcement of the statutes in 18 states. See
Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1998) (enjoining
Wisconsin's statute); Causeway Med. Suite v. Foster, No. Civ. 97-2211, 1999
WL 123389 (E.D. La. Mar. 4, 1999); Planned Parenthood v. Verniero, No. CIV.
97-6170 AET, 1998 WL 849763, at *26 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 1998); A Choice for
Women v. Butterworth, No. 98-0774, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18433 (S.D. Fla.
Nov. 23, 1998); Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1168 (S.D.
Iowa 1998) (issuing a permanent injunction); Eubanks v. Stengel, 28 F. Supp.
2d 1024 (W.D. Ky. 1998); Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (D. Neb.
1998); Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 1 F. Supp. 2d 958 (S.D. Iowa 1998) (is-
suing preliminary injunction); Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 995 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill.
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guage of the statutes to be vague and inclusive of both the D &
E and the D & X procedure.50 Specifically, courts have found
the phrase "delivering into the vagina... a substantial por-
tion"51 of a living fetus particularly vague because "a substan-
tial portion" could be anything from a detached leg or arm to
the entire lower extremities other than the head.5 2 The courts
have then concluded that because a D & E procedure may re-
sult in a portion of the fetus protruding into the vagina, the
statutes have the effect of banning all D & E procedures as well
as D & X procedures.5 3 Courts ruling on state statutes not con-
taining the "substantial portion" language similarly have found
that the statutes likely encompass the D & E procedure be-
1998); Summit Med. Assocs. v. James, 984 F. Supp. 1404 (M.D. Ala. 1998);
Planned Parenthood v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Ariz. 1997); Evans v.
Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Mich. 1997); see also Bopp & Cook, supra note
3, at 5 n.3 (listing unreported cases striking down partial-birth abortion laws
in Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Montana, Rhode Island, and West Vir-
ginia).
50. See Verniero, 1998 WL 849763, at *22 (concluding that the statute
would "effectively ban[ ] suction curettage, D & E and induction abortions");
Eubanks, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1039 (finding that a D & E procedure may satisfy
the elements of Kentucky's statute); Carhart, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1128 (finding
that a fair reading of the statute is that it prohibits D & E abortions); Miller, 1
F. Supp. 2d at 961-62 (holding that because the Iowa legislature rejected
amendments which would have limited the statute to the D & X procedure,
the ban may be interpreted to include D & E abortions and suction curettage
procedures); Ryan, 995 F. Supp. at 854 (concluding that because "delivery" is
given such a broad interpretation in obstetrics the Illinois statute may include
all abortion procedures except hysterotomy and hysterectomy); Woods, 982 F.
Supp. at 1378 (finding that Arizona's statute may include both D & E abor-
tions and induction abortions); Evans, 977 F. Supp. at 1311 (determining that
the statute is "hopelessly ambiguous" and may easily be interpreted to ban D
& E abortions).
51. H.R. 1122, 105th Cong. §2(b)(3) (1997); see also supra notes 47-48 and
accompanying text.
52. See Verniero, 1998 WL 849763, at *14 (determining that there was no
consensus among the experts over what constitutes a "substantial portion");
Eubanks, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1034 (finding it unclear "what might comprise a
substantial portion of a fetus"); Carhart, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1129-32 (recogniz-
ing that "[iun any sensible and ordinary reading of the word, a leg or arm is
'substantialm and that the term "substantial portion" is a vague term, espe-
cially when none of the testifying doctors could supply a conclusive definition).
53. See Carhart, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1128 (interpreting Nebraska's ban to
include D & E abortions because an arm or leg is routinely delivered into the
vagina as a part of performing a D & E and the physician is then required to
dismember the fetus outside of the uterus); Miller, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 962 (stat-
ing that evidence shows that "portions of the fetus may be present in the va-
gina while others remaining in the uterus still have a heartbeat or other sign
of life").
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cause occasionally a fragmented living fetus is delivered into
the vagina.5 4 Furthermore, courts addressing statutes that
lacked an explicit intent requirement found that any ambiguity
about the statute's scope justified finding the statute unconsti-
tutional.55
However, not all courts addressing these general partial-
birth abortion statutes have found the language vague and in-
clusive of D & E procedures. In Planned Parenthood v. Doyle,
56
a district court in Wisconsin found that the statute was only
ambiguous if one equated "'a living child' with 'dismembered
portions of a living child.'"57 The court then concluded that
"[dlismembered body parts are neither a 'child' nor are they
'living' in the ordinary meaning of those words."58 Moreover,
the court found that because the subject of the act was partial-
birth abortion, the term necessarily required the delivery of an
intact child, not dismembered body parts.59 However, the Sev-
enth Circuit reversed and granted a preliminary injunction
staying enforcement of the statute.60 The Seventh Circuit
54. See Ryan, 995 F. Supp. at 855 (describing how in a suction curettage
abortion a living fetus may be delivered partially into the vagina through a
cannula and how in a D & E procedure a physician may partially deliver a
living fetus into the vagina); Evans, 977 F. Supp. at 1307 (finding the statute
ambiguous as to whether it applies only to an intact fetus or also to a frag-
mented fetus); Woods, 982 F. Supp. at 1377 (finding that the unpredictable
possibility of the fetus protruding into the vagina while a D & E is performed
would cause the statute to include D & E abortions).
55. See Ryan, 995 F. Supp. at 857 (stating that inclusion of "knowingly"
does not satisfy the intent requirement because a physician is aware of the
risk in virtually all abortion procedures that the fetus may protrude into the
vagina); Evans, 977 F. Supp. at 1308-09 (determining that the lack of an in-
tent requirement combined with the statute's vagueness made the statute un-
constitutional).
56. 9 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (W.D. Wis. 1998), rev'd, 162 F.3d 463 (7th Cir.
1998).
57. Id. at 1041.
58. Id. The Wisconsin partial-birth abortion ban statute defined partial-
birth abortion as "an abortion in which a person partially vaginally delivers a
living child, causes the death of the partially delivered child with the intent to
kill the child, and then completes the delivery of the child." WIs. STAT. ANN. §
940.16 (West Supp. 1998).
59. See Doyle, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1041 (citing dictionary definitions of the
term "birth" which indicate that the term may "readily appl[y] to the partial
delivery of an intact child but hardly appli[es] to the delivery of dismembered
body parts"). But see Planned Parenthood v. Verniero, No. CIV. 97-6170 AET,
1998 WL 849763, at *13 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 1998) (rejecting the argument that
calling the act partial-birth abortion would make it inapplicable to fetal parts).
60. See Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1998).
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found that the statute was vague because it was possible for a
doctor to be convicted under the statute when a fetus dies in
the birth canal as part of a medical induction because the doc-
tor is aware of this potential risk.61
Relying upon the analysis of the district court in Doyle, the
Fourth Circuit ordered a stay of a preliminary injunction
against Virginia's partial-birth abortion law.62 The Fourth Cir-
cuit found that the law could apply only to intact deliveries of a
living fetus and not mere removal of dismembered body parts of
a deceased fetus.63 In addition, the court found that the deliv-
ery of the fetus must be intentional, deliberate, and "'for the
purpose of performing a procedure' that 'will kill the fetus."64
61. See id. at 469; see also infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (list-
ing other reasons the Seventh Circuit gave for issuing the preliminary injunc-
tion). But see infra notes 147-152 and accompanying text (describing induc-
tion abortions and explaining why a partial-birth infanticide ban would not
encompass medical induction).
62. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326, 331 (4th
Cir. 1998) (granting a stay of the preliminary injunction issued by the district
court because plaintiffs did not perform D & X procedures and so lacked
standing to challenge the statute). The Gilmore Court agreed with the rea-
soning of the Doyle court that dismembered body parts could not be equated
with intact fetuses. See id. at 328-29; supra notes 57-58 and accompanying
text; infra note 63 and accompanying text.
63. See Gilmore, 144 F.3d at 328-29. The court listed three reasons why
the statute could not be read to include abortion procedures other than the D
& X method. First, the statute only prohibited delivery of intact fetuses, not
the extraction of dismembered body parts. See id. Second, the statute only
prohibited delivery of a living fetus, not fetuses killed in the uterus. See id. at
329. Third, the statute only prohibited delivery into the vagina, not "through
the vagina via an enclosed cannula or similar bypass." Id.
64 Id. at 329 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74.2 (Michie 1997)). "[Elven
the intentional and deliberate delivery of a living fetus into the vagina does
not violate the statute unless it is performed for the specific purpose of per-
forming a procedure the provider knows will kill the fetus." Id. at 328; see also
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74.2(D) (defining a partial-birth abortion as "an abor-
tion in which the person performing the abortion deliberately and intention-
ally delivers a living fetus or substantial portion thereof into the vagina for the
purpose of performing a procedure the person knows will kill the fetus, per-
forms the procedure, kills the fetus and completes the delivery"). The court
found that a physician performing the suction curettage procedure would fail
to satisfy the mens rea requirement because he or she would not be removing
an intact fetus intentionally, would not know if the fetus was alive when re-
moved through the cannula, and would not deliver the fetus into the uterus for
the purpose of performing an additional procedure to kill the fetus because
"the very act of extracting the fetus from the uterus through the cannula is
itself the procedure that kills the fetus." Gilmore, 144 F.3d at 329; see also
Eubanks v. Stengel, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1034 (W.D. Ky. 1998) (reaching the
same conclusion about suction curettage procedures). Similarly, the Gilmore
court found that a physician performing a D & E procedure does not satisfy
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Thus, the only abortion method which would be banned by the
Virginia law was the D & X procedure, because the ban applied
only to delivery of an intact fetus for the purpose of killing it.
65
Even if partial-birth abortion bans are interpreted to apply
only to the D & X method, they must still pass Casey's undue
burden test to be constitutional as applied to pre-viability abor-
tions.66 At least one court has found that a partial-birth abor-
tion ban imposes an undue burden on a woman seeking an
abortion because all of the alternative procedures carry "an ap-
preciably greater risk of injury or death."6 7 Yet, the district
court in Doyle reached the opposite conclusion, finding that the
D & X procedure is no safer than the D & E procedure and that
the mens rea requirement because the intention is to kill the fetus in the
uterus, not in the vagina. See Gilmore, 144 F.3d at 330.
65. See Gilmore, 144 F.3d at 328-30 (describing how suction curettage and
D & E abortions are not included in the ban because neither the actus reus nor
the mens rea elements of the statute are satisfied). The court recognized that
even if the actus reus portion of the statute was interpreted more broadly than
the plain language reading that the court employed, the challenging plaintiff-
doctors would still not violate the act without performing a D & X procedure
because of the mens rea requirement. See supra notes 63-64 and accompany-
ing text (describing the actus reus and mens rea elements of the statute).
66. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (requiring that the undue burden analysis be applied to state regula-
tions of pre-viability abortions).
67. Carhart v. Stenberg, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1121 (D. Neb. 1998). In
granting the permanent injunction, the court relied upon the earlier findings
in the preliminary injunction hearing that D & X procedures are safer than D
& E abortions. See Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507, 525-27 (D. Neb.
1997) (discussing the comparative safety of the D & X procedure and the D &
E procedure, induction, hysterectomy or hysterotomy and further recognizing
the problems of inducing fetal death by injection prior to the procedure). The
district court found the D & X procedure to be safer than the D & E procedure
for the following reasons: (1) it reduces instrumentation in the uterus; (2) it
reduces potential perforation from bony fragments; (3) it prevents the likeli-
hood of retained fetal parts in the uterus; and (4) it involves "less operative
time, which means less risk of hemorrhage, less total bleeding and less risk of
infection when the procedure is used." Id. Other courts also have found the D
& X to be safer than the D & E, but have not proceeded to determine if ban-
ning the safer procedure violates Casey's undue burden test because their in-
terpretation of the challenged statutes was that both D & E and D & X proce-
dures were banned. See, e.g., Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 11
F. Supp. 2d 795, 827 n.40 (E.D. Va. 1998) (concluding that evidence on record
showed that "the D & X procedure is often far safer than other D & E proce-
dures"); Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 995 F. Supp. 847, 852 (N.D. Il. 1998) (reciting
advantages of the D & X procedure over D & E abortions); Evans v. Kelley,
977 F. Supp. 1283, 1296 (E.D. Miich. 1997) (reporting that testimony from doc-
tors showed that the D & X procedures "reduce risks associated with conven-
tional D & Es").
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both the AMA and ACOG can identify no situation in which a D
& X procedure is the only appropriate abortion option.68 How-
ever, the Seventh Circuit rejected this conclusion and found
that even though there are no scientific studies on the com-
parative safety of the D & X procedure, medical opinion sup-
ports the view that the D & X may be the safest procedure. 69
Thus, courts reaching the issue have concluded that a ban of
the D & X procedure violates Casey's undue burden test be-
cause there is an increased risk of injury or death with other
procedures.70
Courts also have found unconstitutional partial-birth abor-
tion ban statutes that fail to include an exception for instances
in which continuing the pregnancy would constitute a threat to
the health of the mother.7 1 Other courts have taken this analy-
sis a step further and found that the statutes must provide an
exception for mental health risks, as well as physical health
risks. 72
68. See Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1044 (W.D. Wis.
1998) (relying on the views of the AMA and the ACOG that "a ban on intact
D & E's leaves women with other appropriate abortion options"), rev'd, 162
F.3d 463 (7th Cir. 1998). The court further surmised that since the vast ma-jority of doctors are not performing the D & X procedure, the procedure must
not be greatly safer than the D & E procedure. See id. at 1045.
69. See Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463, 468 (7th Cir. 1998);
see also Planned Parenthood v. Verniero, No. CIV. 97-6170 AET, 1998 WL
849763, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 1998) (recognizing that there are no valid statis-
tics on the relative safety of the D & X procedure).
70. See Doyle, 162 F.3d at 468; Carhart, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1123.
71. See, e.g., Doyle, 162 F.3d at 468 (concluding that the lack of an excep-
tion for the mother's health makes Wisconsin's partial-birth abortion statute
unconstitutional); Verniero, 1998 WL 849763, at *23 (listing health problems
associated with pregnancy and concluding that the lack of a health exception
makes the statute unconstitutional); Eubanks v. Stengel, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1024,
1041 (W.D. Ky. 1998) (stating that the absence of a health exception would
seem to violate Casey); Ryan, 995 F. Supp. at 857 (finding Illinois's partial-
birth abortion ban unconstitutional because it failed to provide an exception to
the ban when the woman's health is endangered); Summit Med. Assocs. v.
James, 984 F. Supp. 1401, 1455 (M.D. Ala 1998) (granting injunctive relief
against Alabama's partial-birth abortion because it lacked "any maternal
health exception whatsoever"); Planned Parenthood v. Woods, 982 F. Supp.
1369, 1378 (D. Ariz. 1997) (finding Arizona's statute unconstitutional because
it failed to provide an exception where the partial-birth abortion procedure is
necessary for a woman's health). Casey requires post-viability abortion regu-
lations to provide an exception for the health, as well as the life, of the mother.
505 U.S. at 879; supra note 31.
72. See Ryan, 995 F. Supp. at 857 (requiring that an exception to the ban
be made for a woman's mental and physical health). In addressing the neces-
sity of a woman's health exception in determining the constitutionality of a
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D. A NEW APPROACH: BANNING PARTLAL-BIRTH INFANTICIDE
By explicitly banning partial-birth procedures as infanti-
cide, proposed Washington Initiative 694 approached partial-
birth procedures from quite a different perspective than all
prior partial-birth abortion bans.73 Rather than define partial-
birth abortion in procedural terms, Initiative 694 defined par-
tial-birth procedures in terms of the birth process. 74 Specifi-
cally, partial-birth infanticide statutes like Initiative 694 would
ban the performance of a procedure on a partially-born infant
ban on post-viability abortions, rather than the ban of the D & X procedure,
the Sixth Circuit also found that an exception must be made for both the men-
tal and physical health of the mother. See Women's Med. Profl Corp. v. Voi-
novich, 130 F.3d 187, 209 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1347 (1998)
(surmising that the Supreme Court is likely to hold that a woman must be
able to obtain a post-viability abortion "if carrying the fetus to term would
cause severe non-temporary mental and emotional harm"). Both of these
courts relied upon the definition of "health" supplied by Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179 (1973), the companion case to Roe v. Wade. Doe stated that physical, emo-
tional, psychological, and familial concerns, as well as the woman's age, are all
factors "relevant to the well-being of the patient [and] may relate to health."
410 U.S. at 192. However, in dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Voino-
vich, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas questioned
the application of Doe's definition of health to post-viability abortions and
stated that the constitutionality of a post-viability abortion regulation that
lacks a mental health exception has never been addressed by the Supreme
Court. See Voinovich v. Women's Med. Profl Corp., 118 S. Ct. 1347, 1349
(1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
73. Compare infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text (describing other
states' partial-birth abortion bans), with infra notes 74-81 and accompanying
text (describing Initiative 694).
74. See Initiative 694 § 2(1) ("Partial-birth infanticide' means the killing
of an infant in the process of birth by a person who deliberately and intention-
ally performs a procedure on the partially born infant that the person knows
will terminate the life of the infant and the procedure does terminate the life
of the infant."). Although the language of Initiative 694 is unique, other states
have made similar arguments when their statutes were challenged. For ex-
ample, the defendants in Planned Parenthood v. Woods argued that a physi-
cian performing a partial-birth abortion was committing infanticide. 982 F.
Supp. 1369, 1377 (D. Ariz. 1997). However, given the language of the statute,
the court rejected the distinction and analyzed the statute as regulating abor-
tion. See id. In Carhart v. Stenberg, the defendants argued that there is no
right to kill a partially-born human being, but the court rejected this argu-
ment because there was "no precedent for it." 972 F. Supp. 507, 529 (D. Neb.
1997). The Seventh Circuit also concluded that "there [was] no issue of infan-
ticide" because the state merely was regulating procedures and would have
permitted the fetus to be killed by an alternative procedure. See Planned Par-
enthood v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1998). Finally, the district court
in Planned Parenthood v. Verniero rejected the legislature's argument that the
statute was not governed by Roe or Casey. No. CIV. 97-6170 AET, 1998 WL
849763, at *18 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 1998).
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that is intended to kill the infant and terminates the life of the
infant.7 5
As the first proposed partial-birth infanticide ban, Initia-
tive 694 outlined the process of birth as beginning after the oc-
currence of three steps: (1) dilation, (2) rupture of the amniotic
sac (in layman's terms, "the water is broken"), and (3) passage
of any part of the fetus into the birth canal.76 Initiative 694
emphasized that it intended to ban only infanticide, not abor-
tion.7 7 It declared that abortion is limited to terminating a
pregnancy by killing the fetus inside of the uterus before the
process of birth begins, while infanticide refers to the killing of
an infant in the process of birth.78 The Initiative further noted
that the Supreme Court has never held that there is a funda-
mental right to commit infanticide,7 9 and proclaimed that as a
result, banning infanticide "does not implicate abortion juris-
prudence."80 Finally, Initiative 694 stated that its purpose was
"to stop the killing of partially-born infant children and to es-
tablish and maintain a clear and impenetrable barrier against
partial-birth infanticide."8'
IE. THE INFANTICIDE BRIDGE
The crux of a partial-birth infanticide ban is its definition
of when the birth process begins.8 2 By setting forth a three-
step formulation of when birth begins and then banning the
killing of an infant in the process of birth,3 statutes like Initia-
tive 694 seek to avoid the vagueness problems of other states'
75. See Initiative 694 § 2(1).
76. See id. § 2(3).
"Process of birth" means the pregnancy has ended and the process of
being born has begun, that is, the point in time has occurred when the
maternal cervix has become dilated, the protective membrane of the
amniotic sac has become ruptured, and any part or member of an in-
fant child has passed from the uterus or womb beyond the plane of
the cervical os.
Id.
77. See id. § 1(8), (11); infra Part II.A.
78. See Initiative 694 § 1(7), (8); infra Part HIA2.
79. See id. § 1(9) (noting that the Supreme Court "has never held that
there is a fundamental or constitutional right to kill a partially born infant,
that is, a child in the process of birth").
80. Id. § 1(10) (distinguishing abortion as the termination of a pregnancy
and not the killing of a partially-born infant).
81. Id. § 1(11).
82. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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statutes. 84 In order to avoid falling into the same arguments as
partial-birth abortion bans, the definition of the birth process
used by partial-birth infanticide statutes must be medically ac-
curate and not encompass abortion procedures other than par-
tial-birth procedures.
A. THE MEDICAL ACcuRACY OF INITIATIVE 694'S DEFINITIONS
Medical dictionaries tend to define birth tautologically as
"the act of being born."85 However, turning to the definition of
labor, the three criteria for the initiation of the birth process
quickly emerge. 86 The criteria for the beginning of the birth
process, which would be identified by a partial-birth infanticide
statute, parallels the activity that occurs in the first and second
stages of labor.87 For example, Initiative 694 defined the first
criterion for the beginning of the birth process as the dilation of
the maternal cervix.88 In the first stage of labor, the cervix is
effaced and dilated, creating an opening to the vagina.89 The
edges of the dilated cervix bordering the vagina form the exter-
nal cervical os, or opening, to the birth canal.90 When the cer-
vix is fully dilated, the amniotic sac, which is the membrane
84 See supra notes 50-65 and accompanying text (describing the vague-
ness concerns of courts addressing partial-birth abortion bans).
85. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 202 (28th ed. 1994)
(defining birth "as the act or process of being born"); THOMAS L. STEDMAN,
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 207 (26th ed. 1995) (defining birth as the
"act of being born").
86. See BLACK'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 322-23 (37th ed. 1992) (defining
labor in terms of three stages); STEDMAN, supra note 85, at 926-27 (dividing
labor into three stages). But see DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL
DICTIONARY, supra note 85, at 892 (recognizing a fourth stage of labor as "the
hour or two after delivery, when uterine tone is established").
87. See infra notes 88-93. The third stage of labor, which consists of the
removal of the placenta from the uterus, occurs after the birth process is com-
plete. See DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 85, at
892 (describing the third stage as beginning with expulsion of the infant and
ending with complete expulsion of the placenta); STEDMAN, supra note 85, at
927 (describing the third stage as removal of the placenta).
88. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
89. See HARRY OxORN, HUMAN LABOR AND BIRTH 117-28 (5th ed. 1986)
(describing the effacement and dilation of the cervix); WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS
266 (F. Gary Cunningham et al. eds., 20th ed. 1997) (describing effacement of
the cervix as "the 'obliteration' or 'taking up' of the cervix" into the lower
uterine segment). The cervix is the neck of the uterus leading to the vagina.
See DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 85, at 303;
STEDMAN, supra note 85, at 314.
90. See DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 85, at
1195; STEDMAN, supra note 85, at 1263.
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around the fetus,91 normally ruptures if it has not been broken
prior to full dilation of the cervix.92 Thus, Initiative 694 identi-
fied the rupture of the amniotic sac as the second criterion for
the beginning of the birth process.9 3
Once the cervix is fully dilated, the second stage of labor
begins. The second stage of labor entails the descent of the in-
fant from the uterus to its complete expulsion from the
mother.9 4 At the end of the second stage of labor the birth pro-
cess is complete.9 5 Because partial-birth infanticide statutes
are only seeking to ban the performance of partial-birth infan-
ticides, their definition would not follow the birth process to its
completion as it is medically defined.9 6 Instead, these statutes
would define the third criterion for the beginning of the birth
process as the passage of any part of the fetus from the uterus
to the birth canal.9 7
The second crucial component of partial-birth infanticide
statutes is the way in which they define and distinguish the
term "abortion." Initiative 694 defined abortion as "the termi-
nation of a pregnancy by intentionally killing a living human
fetus in the uterus or womb before the process of birth be-
gins."98 Medical dictionary definitions of abortion encompass
91. See DORLAND's ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 85, at
60; STEDMAN, supra note 85, at 62.
92. See ALFRED BECK, BECK'S OBSTETRICAL PRACTICE 188 (E. Stewart
Taylor ed., 9th ed. 1971) (noting that the membrane usually ruptures shortly
after the cervix is fully dilated); BLACK's MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 86,
at 323 (recognizing that "full dilation of the cervix is usually accompanied by
the rupture" of the amniotic sac).
93. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
94. See DORLAND's ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 85, at
892; STEDMAN, supra note 85, at 927.
95. See BLACK'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 86, at 322 (describing
the second stage of labor as the expulsion of the child); STEDMAN, supra note
85, at 927 (defining the second stage of labor as "expulsive effort, beginning
with complete dilation of the cervix and ending with expulsion of the infant").
96. Clearly, the killing of an infant upon the completion of stage two when
it is fully outside of the mother would be homicide, which is already outlawed.
97. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 52-54
and accompanying text (describing how detached parts of a fetus may pass
into the birth canal during an abortion). The language of Initiative 694 could
be changed in the enactment of new partial-birth infanticide statutes by de-
fining the third step of the birth process as the passage of any intact part of
the fetus into the birth canal. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text;
see also Planned Parenthood v. Verniero, No. CIV. 97-6170 AET, 1998 WL
849763, at * 1 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 1998) (noting that New Jersey's ban failed to re-
quire that the fetus be intact when the procedure is performed).
98. Initiative 694 § 1(7).
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both natural and induced abortions and do not identify the
point at which the fetus is no longer living.99 However, the
term aborticide more narrowly describes the intentional in-
ducement of an abortion and is limited to the killing of an un-
born fetus in the uterus.100 A partial-birth procedure cannot be
characterized properly as aborticide because the infant nor-
mally is killed when its lower extremities are in the birth canal
rather than in the uterus and because the infant is no longer
unborn but in the process of being born.10 1
In addition to the fact that induced abortions are limited to
the killing of an unborn fetus inside of the uterus, a second
component of a partial-birth infanticide ban's definition of abor-
tion further explains why a partial-birth procedure is not an
abortion. Partial-birth infanticide bans would define abortion
as the termination of pregnancy 102 and establish the parame-
ters of pregnancy as beginning with conception and ending with
99. See STEDMAN, supra note 85, at 4 (defining abortion as "the expulsion
from the uterus of an embryo or fetus prior to the stage of viability at about 20
weeks of gestation" with sub-definitions indicating that the term encompasses
both spontaneous and induced abortions); DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL
DICTIONARY, supra note 85, at 4-5 (defining abortion as the premature expul-
sion of the products of conception from the uterus with sub-definitions de-
scribing both spontaneous and induced abortions). Even legal texts do not
identify clearly whether abortion is limited to the termination of fetal life
within the uterus. Compare BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 7 (5th ed. 1979) (de-
fining abortion as "intentional expulsion or removal of an unborn child from
the womb other than for the principal purpose of producing a live birth," which
would not necessarily limit abortions to extinguishing fetal life within the
uterus), with id at 699 (distinguishing abortion from infanticide because abor-
tion "denote[s] the destruction of the fetus in the womb").
100. See BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 4 (3d ed. 1969) (defining aborti-
cide as "the killing of the fetus in the uterus"); BLAKISTON'S GOULD MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 4 (4th ed. 1979) (defining aborticide as "the killing of an unborn
fetus"); THE LAW DICTIONARY 5 (7th ed. 1997) (defining aborticide as "the
killing of the fetus in the uterus"); WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 5 (3d ed. 1986) (defining aborticide as the "act of destroying a fe-
tus within the uterus").
10L See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text (describing partial-birth
procedures).
102, See supra note 98 and accompanying text; see also THE DICTIONARY OF
MODERN MEDICINE 2 (1992) (defining induced abortion as "the voluntary ter-
mination of pregnancy"); BENJAMIN F. MILLER, MILLER-KEANE ENCYCLOPEDIA
& DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, NURSING & ALLIED HEALTH 3 (6th ed. 1997) (de-
fining abortion as the "termination of pregnancy" and induced abortion as "the
deliberate interruption of pregnancy"); STEDMAN, supra note 85, at 4 (defining
criminal abortion as "the termination of pregnancy without legal justifica-
tion").
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the birth process. 103 Both the beginning and ending points of
this definition of pregnancy are recognized as medically accu-
rate. 0 4 A partial-birth procedure cannot be characterized cor-
rectly as an abortion because the pregnancy already has ended
with the beginning of the birth process. 105 Thus, a partial-birth
procedure is not an abortion because the infant is killed when it
is at least partially outside of the uterus and also because the
pregnancy already has been terminated by the beginning of the
birth process.
The final and most critical definitional component of par-
tial-birth infanticide statutes is that they refer to a child in the
process of birth as an infant rather than a fetus. 106 Infanticide
is recognized medically and legally as the killing of an infant.107
The medical profession does not appear to endorse the use of
either the term fetus or infant for offspring in the process of
birth. 10 8 Medical texts use fetus to describe an unborn child 10 9
103. See Initiative 694 § 1(1) ("Pregnancy begins with conception and ends
when the process of birth begins.").
104. See BLAKISTON'S GOULD MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 100, at
1092 (defining pregnancy as "the state of a woman... from conception to par-
turition"); STEDMAN, supra note 85, at 1420 (defining pregnancy as "the condi-
tion of a female after conception until the birth of the baby").
105. The pregnancy has been terminated because once the amniotic sac has
been broken, the birth process is irreversible because delay of more than a
couple days will lead to infection. See Affidavit of Robert V. Bethel, D.O. 6,
In re Initiative 694 (Thurston County, Wash., Super. Ct. Apr. 29, 1998) (No.
98-2-01009-3) (stating that once the sac is ruptured there is an increased vul-
nerability to infection, making birth inevitable); QxORN, supra note 89, at 124(recognizing that the bursting of the amniotic sac is an irreversible factor).
But see Declaration of Deborah J. Oyer, M.D. % 5(e), In re Initiative 694(Thurston County, Wash., Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 1998) (No. 98-2-01009-3) (stating
that the pregnancy does not end until the fetus has completely exited the
woman's body); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 99, at 1061 (requiring
the child to be delivered before the pregnancy terminates); supra note 104(citing medical dictionary definitions of pregnancy that could be interpreted as
requiring a completed birth before the pregnancy is considered over).
106. See Initiative 694 § 1(5).
107. See DORLAND's ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 85, at
836 (defining infanticide as the taking of the life of an infant"); STEDMAN, su-
pra note 85, at 867 (defining infanticide as "the killing of an infant").
108. See MILLER, supra note 102, at 888 (using the terms fetus or newborn
interchangeably in defining labor); TURNBULL'S OBSTETRICS 574-75 (Geoffrey
Chamberlain ed., 2d ed. 1995) (using the term fetus and baby interchangeably
in describing labor).
109. See BLACK'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 86, at 221 (defining fe-
tus as the "unborn child"); DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY,
supra note 85, at 617 (defining fetus as the "unborn offspring").
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and infant to describe a child from birth up to age one.' 10 Thus,
specific nomenclature for a child in the process of birth does not
exist in medical literature. Nonetheless, medical dictionaries
and obstetrics textbooks more commonly utilize the term infant
rather than fetus once the second stage of labor has begun and
the child has begun to exit the uterus.11 Moreover, since a fe-
tus is an unborn child, a child in the process of birth cannot
properly retain this description because the birth process is ir-
reversible once the amniotic sac is broken and the child has en-
tered the birth canal. 1 2 Thus, partial-birth infanticide statutes
appropriately assign the title of infant to a child in the process
of birth."13
B. INITIATIvE 694's BAN ON PARTiAL-BuiTH PROCEDURES
Given the above definitions and their medical accuracy,
partial-birth infanticide statutes would ban the D & X proce-
dure. A D & X procedure includes the occurrence of each of the
three steps that partial-birth infanticide statutes would de-
scribe as initiating the birth process. 114 The first step of the D
& X method is dilation of the cervix, which is also the first cri-
terion for the beginning of the birth process." 5 Once the cervix
110. See DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 85, at
836 (defining infant as "a young child ... from birth to 12 months).
111. See BLACK'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 86, at 323 (using the
term child rather than fetus in describing the stages of labor); DORLAND'S
ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 85, at 892 (using the term in-
fant in describing the second stage of labor); OXORN, supra note 89, at 128
(baby); MILLER, supra note 102, at 889 (infant); STEDMAN, supra note 85, at
926-27 (infant). But see DANFORTH's OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 115-16
(James R. Scott et al. eds., 7th ed. 1994) (using the term fetus to describe the
child throughout the stages of labor); GYNECOLOGY AND OBSTETRICS: A
LONGITUDINAL APPROACH 599-601 (Thomas R. Moore et al. eds., 1993) (de-
scribing the child as a fetus throughout the second stage of labor);
OBSTETRICS: NORMAL AND PROBLEM PREGNANCIES 372-73 (Steven G. Gabbe
et al. eds., 3d ed. 1996) (continuing to use the term fetus until the birth proc-
ess is complete).
112. See supra notes 105, 109 and accompanying text. This is true even of
a premature fetus, which will be born alive if not killed in the process. See in-
fra notes 168-170 and accompanying text. But see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 99, at 699 (stating that infanticide is the killing of an infant soon
after birth, which could imply that the birth must be complete before the child
is recognized as an infant); STEDMAN, supra note 85, at 638 (defining fetus as
the "product of conception to the moment of birth," which could be interpreted
to use the term fetus to describe the child until the birth is complete).
113. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 23, 26 and accompanying text.
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is dilated, a doctor performing a D & X procedure will normally
seek to manipulate the fetus to the breech position.116 In order
for the fetus to rotate inside of the uterus, the amniotic sac
must rupture, which is the second criterion for the beginning of
the birth process. 117 After the fetus is in the breech position,
the doctor extracts the lower extremities of the fetus from the
uterus, passing through the plane of the cervical os into the
birth canal of the vagina, which is the third criterion for the
beginning of the birth process. 18 Since the birth process has
begun and the fetus has partially passed into the birth canal,
the fetus is now an infant. 119 The final step of a D & X proce-
dure, in which the brain contents of the infant are evacuated, 120
may properly be described as "[the intentional killing of an in-
fant child in the process of birth."121 Thus, partial-birth infan-
ticide statutes would ban the D & X procedure because it is not
an abortion procedure but a form of infanticide. 122
C. INITIATIvE 694's ExcLUSION OF ABORTION PROCEDURES
Unlike partial-birth abortion statutes, partial-birth infan-
ticide statutes could not be interpreted to ban any abortion pro-
cedures. 123 First, in most abortion procedures the three steps
necessary for the birth process to begin do not occur.124 Second,
in all abortion procedures the fetus is killed within the uterus
rather than during the birth process. 125 Finally, partial-birth
infanticide statutes would require the doctor deliberately and
intentionally to kill a partially-born infant-the bans would not
apply if the doctor intended to kill the fetus in utero. 126
For each of the above listed reasons, a partial-birth infanti-
cide statute would not prohibit the performance of suction cu-
116. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (describing how a doctor
grasps onto a lower extremity of the fetus and pulls it into the vagina).
117. See WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 89, at 482-85 (describing pro-
cedures to rotate a fetus once the amniotic sac is burst).
118. See supra notes 24, 95 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 107-112 and accompanying text (defining the words
infanticide and infant).
120. See supra notes 4,25 and accompanying text.
121. Initiative 694 § 1(6).
122. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (noting that courts have
drawn a distinction between D & E and D & X procedures).
124. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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rettage abortions, the most common first trimester abortion
procedure. 127 Although suction curettage abortions do include
cervical dilation and rupture of the amniotic sac, 128 the third
step of the birth process does not occur in a suction curettage
abortion because no part of the infant child passes the plane of
the external cervical os. 129 A physician performing a suction
curettage abortion inserts the suction cannula into the uterine
cavity just past the internal cervical os. 130 Thus, no part of the
fetus is able to pass from the uterus into the birth canal except
through the suction cannula because the cannula is inserted
well beyond the plane of the external cervical os. 131 Without fe-
tal passage into the birth canal, the process of birth does not
begin and a ban on partial-birth infanticide is never trig-
gered.132 In addition, during suction curettage abortions, the
fetus normally dies prior to removal from the uterus. 133 The fe-
tus normally is not developed enough to withstand the pressure
of the suction within the uterus because suction curettage abor-
tions are performed during the first trimester.134 Therefore,
the fetus is dismembered and dies from the suction of the can-
nula itself.135 Because it causes the end of the fetal life within
the uterus, suction curettage is not a partial-birth infanticide
procedure and thus would not be not banned by partial-birth
infanticide statutes. 136
127. See supra note 14.
128. See HERN, supra note 15, at 108-17 (describing the steps of a suction
curettage abortion as beginning with dilation of the cervix and the passage of
amniotic fluid through the cannula followed by often unidentifiable fetal
parts).
129. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
130. See HERN, supra note 15, at 114.
13L Cf. supra note 63 (noting that delivery of the fetus through the vagina
in the enclosure of a cannula is not delivery into the vagina).
132. See supra notes 76,97 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 64.
134 See supra note 14 (stating that suction curettage abortions are nor-
mally performed between the sixth and twelfth week of development).
135. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326, 329 (4th
Cir. 1998) (recognizing that "the very act of extracting the fetus from the
uterus through the cannula ... kills the fetus").
136. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. In addition, a doctor could
not be prosecuted under a partial-birth infanticide statute for performing a
suction curettage abortion because he or she would lack the necessary intent
to kill a partially-born infant. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining that a partial-birth infanticide statute requires deliberate and inten-
tional action as a prerequisite to prosecution); ef supra notes 64-65 and ac-
companying text (describing why a doctor performing a suction curettage
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A partial-birth infanticide ban also would continue to per-
mit the performance of D & E abortions. The first and second
criteria for the beginning of the birth process occur in a D & E
abortion,137 but the birth process never begins because no part
of the infant passes into the birth canal.138 Although dismem-
bered parts of a fetus may pass into the birth canal, 139 these
cannot be described properly as parts of a partially-born infant
child for two reasons. First, dismembered body parts are not a
child. 40 Second, a birth does not occur with delivery of dis-
membered body parts, but upon the expulsion of an intact liv-
ing being from the uterus. 141 In addition, partial-birth infanti-
cide statutes would not ban D & E abortions because the fetus
is killed in the uterus before the process of birth begins. 42 The
fetal dismemberment performed within the uterus normally
will effectuate the demise of the fetus. 143 However, in some in-
stances the fetus may have a heartbeat for a short period of
time.14 Even though the fetus may continue to live temporar-
ily following dismemberment, the physician does not perform
additional procedures to kill the fetus while removing the fetal
parts from the uterus because fetal death is already certain. 145
Furthermore, in those rare situations in which the fetus is re-
abortion would lack the requisite intent to perform a partial-birth abortion).
137. See Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507, 512-13 (D. Neb. 1997) (de-
scribing wider dilation of the cervix and the use of vacuum aspiration or for-
ceps to rupture the amniotic membrane); HEIN, supra note 15, at 137-38 (dis-
cussing advantages of rupturing the amniotic membrane before beginning
surgical evacuation); supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text (describing the
first and second criteria of the initiation of the birth process).
138. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (stating that it is possi-
ble in a D & E abortion for dismembered parts of a fetus to pass into the birth
canal while the fetus is still alive inside of the uterus).
140. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 15, 78 and accompanying text.
143. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326, 330 (4th
Cir. 1998) (stating that extracting limbs from a fetus will kill the fetus in the
uterus).
144. See Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507, 513 (D. Neb. 1997) (noting
testimony from doctors that fetal heartbeat may continue after dismember-
ment); supra note 53 (stating that the fetus may continue to have a heartbeat
after dismemberment).
145. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (indicating that a person
only violates the statute if he performs a procedure on a partially-born infant).
In a D & E abortion a doctor would not perform a life-terminating procedure
on a partially-born infant because the life-terminating procedure has already
been performed in utero.
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moved intact from the uterus, the physician will not have per-
formed a procedure to terminate the life of a partially-born in-
fant deliberately or intentionally, because the only intent was
to deliver dismembered body parts, not an infant.1 46 Therefore,
a partial-birth infanticide statute would not prohibit the per-
formance of D & E abortions.
In addition to suction curettage and D & E abortions, in-
duction abortions still could be performed under a partial-birth
infanticide statute. While all three steps that are necessary for
the process of birth to begin do occur during this procedure, 147
an induction abortion would not violate a partial-birth infanti-
cide statute because the fetus is killed in the uterus by the in-
fusion, not while it is in the process of birth. 48 Even if the fe-
tus is still living when it passes into the birth canal, 149 a doctor
performing an induction abortion does not perform any addi-
tional procedures on the partially-born infant to terminate its
life.' 50 Instead, the infant will expire as a result of the prior in-
fusions into the amniotic sac or the fetal oxygen supply being
cut off by induced contractions.' 5' Finally, a doctor performs an
induction abortion with the intent that the fetus will be dead
before it passes out of the uterus and thus does nothing delib-
erately or intentionally to kill a partially-born infant. 152
Finally, a partial-birth infanticide ban would not apply to
abortions performed surgically by hysterotomy or hysterectomy
because when those procedures are performed the fetus is not
in the process of birth. In a hysterotomy or hysterectomy the
146. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
147. See HERN, supra note 15, at 145 (describing an induction abortion to
include natural and induced dilation of the cervix, either deliberate or sponta-
neous rupture of the membranes, and delivery of the fetus through the birth
canal).
148. See supra note 17 (describing the drugs used to induce labor and cause
fetal demise).
149. See Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 995 F. Supp. 847, 852 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (noting
that there are rare instances when the fetus is still alive when delivery be-
gins); Planned Parenthood v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369, 1377 (D. Ariz. 1997)
(indicating that the point in an induction abortion at which fetal death occurs
is generally unknown and may occur after the fetus passes through the cervi-
cal os).
150. See supra note 64 and accompanying text; infra note 151 and accom-
panying text.
151. See Eubanks v. Stengel, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1034 (W.D. Ky. 1998);
supra notes 17, 148 and accompanying text.
152. See Eubanks, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1034 (finding that "[n]o separate act
by the physician is anticipated or required" to kill the fetus in an induction
abortion); cf. supra note 145.
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cervix is not dilated and no part of the fetus passes the plane of
the cervical os because the fetus is not removed through the
vagina.153
Ill. DESTINATION-A CONSTITUTIONAL PARTIAL-
BIRTH INFANTICIDE BAN
A. CONSTTUTIONALLY BANNING PARTIAL-BIRTH INFANTICIDE
Given the accuracy and validity of the above medical defi-
nitions and the distinction between abortion and partial-birth
infanticide, a statute banning partial-birth infanticide would be
constitutional. Such a ban would not infringe on a woman's
right to have an abortion because there is no constitutional
right to commit infanticide. The Supreme Court has never rec-
ognized a right to kill a partially-born infant.154 In Roe v.
Wade, the Supreme Court declined to address the unchallenged
portion of the Texas statute which outlawed the killing of a
child in the state of being born.155 Thus, Roe did not establish a
fundamental right to commit partial-birth infanticide.
Moreover, partial-birth infanticide could not be recognized
as a new fundamental right.156 The Supreme Court requires
that the "utmost care" be used in recognizing any new due pro-
cess rights and that restraint be exercised by assuring that any
new right be "objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition." 157 Because infanticide has generally been re-
garded in the Western World as both wrong and criminal, 158
there would be little basis for formulating a fundamental right
to commit partial-birth infanticide under the Court's "deeply
rooted" framework.
Given that there is no fundamental right to commit par-
tial-birth infanticide, partial-birth infanticide bans only need
be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.159
Many of the legitimate government interests recognized by the
Supreme Court for a ban on physician-assisted suicide in Wash-
153. See supra notes 18-19 (describing hysterectomy and hysterotomy as
the surgical removal of either the entire uterus or the fetus from the uterus).
154, See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 3.
156. See infra notes 157-158 and accompanying text.
157. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (citations
omitted).
158. See MICHAEL TOOLEY, ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE 318-19 (1983).
159. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728.
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ington v. Glucksberg would apply with equal force to partial-
birth infanticide bans. In banning both partial-birth proce-
dures and physician-assisted suicide, the government "has an
'unqualified interest in the preservation of human life."1
60
Similarly, because the performance of both physician-assisted
suicide and partial-birth infanticide may lead the public to
question the medical profession's ethics and integrity, a state
has an interest in preventing this erosion of public faith in the
medical community. 161 Finally, while a state may fear physi-
cian-assisted suicide starting "it down the path to voluntary
and perhaps even involuntary euthanasia,"162 a state similarly
may feel that permitting partial-birth procedures is starting it
down the path to legalizing infanticide. 163 Because each of
these is a legitimate government interest that is as applicable
in the context of partial-birth infanticides as in physician-
assisted suicides, a ban on partial-birth infanticides, like a ban
on physician-assisted suicides, passes rational basis review and
is constitutional.164
Alternatively, a state constitutionally could ban partial-
birth infanticide under the traditional police powers of the
state. Although the Supreme Court in Roe stated that the un-
born are not persons under the Fourteenth Amendment, 165 the
160. Id. at 728 (citations omitted). "Washington... insists that all per-
sons' lives, from beginning to end, regardless of physical or mental condition,
are under the full protection of the law." Id. at 729. Because a fetus is recog-
nized as living when it has a heartbeat, this beginning of life should also be
protected. See infra note 170 and accompanying text. But see Planned Par-
enthood v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463, 470 (7th Cir. 1998) (arguing that a partial-
birth procedural ban is not rationally related to a state's interest in the pres-
ervation of fetal life because the statute does not "save any fetuses"-it merely
requires them to die in utero).
161. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731. This rationale is further supported
by the fact that the AMA approved the proposed federal ban on partial-birth
abortion. See 143 CONG. REC. S4670 (daily ed. May 19, 1997) (reprinting a
letter from the AMA to Senator Santorum in which the AMA states that it
supports HR 1122, "The Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1997," as amended
because "the procedure [is now] narrowly defined and not medically indi-
cated").
162. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 732.
163. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
164. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 785 (holding that these interests "are un-
questionably important and legitimate, and Washington's ban on assisted sui-
cide is at least reasonably related to their promotion and protection"). The
same holding could be reached on the constitutionality of a partial-birth infan-
ticide statute.
165. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (concluding that "the word
'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn").
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Court did not determine if an infant in the process of being
born is a person. 166 A child in the state of being born should be
recognized as a person because as long as a partial-birth proce-
dure is not performed, live birth normally will occur. The
Court in Roe emphasized that life should be viewed as begin-
ning at live birth. 67 It is generally recognized in the medical
community that a fetus with a beating heart is alive. 168 Be-
cause the heart normally continues to beat throughout the
birth process and after complete expulsion from the mother, the
child will be born alive if not killed during the birth process. 69
Even if the child is premature and medically nonviable, it is
still likely to be born alive with a beating heart and expire only
after being unable to breathe on its own.170 Therefore, the Su-
preme Court could hold, consistent with Roe, that an infant in
the process of birth is a person because the child is alive during
the birth process and a live birth would have occurred except
166. See Bopp & Cook, supra note 3, at 26 ("A baby who is partially deliv-
ered cannot properly be termed unborn."); see also id. at 28 ("Because the
Court chose birth as the magical border one must cross into the land of per-
sonhood, any procedure that involves movement over that border is constitu-
tionally significant."). But see Planned Parenthood v. Verniero, No. CIV. 97-
6170 AET, 1998 WL 849763, at *18 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 1998) (responding that the
Supreme Court has drawn "the line at viability, not at the uterus").
167. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 160-161.
168. See Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 995 F. Supp. 847, 854 (N.D. Ill 1998) (ac-
knowledging that physicians define "'living' as 'having a heartbeat'" but that
this definition is inconsistent with dictionary definitions); Evans v. Kelley, 977
F. Supp. 1283, 1297 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (stating that there was unanimous
agreement among the doctors testifying that "[a] living fetus means a fetus
having a heartbeat"). But see Planned Parenthood v. Woods, 982 F. Supp.
1369, 1379 (D. Ariz. 1997) (noting that the physicians testifying in that case
disagreed on what a living fetus is).
169. See supra notes 53-54, 149 (describing how a fetus may continue to
live even after a physician performs procedures intended to terminate its life).
If a nonviable fetus may continue to live after dismemberment and chemical
infusion, it is even more likely to be born alive if no procedures intended to kill
it are performed.
170. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (stating that the medical
community defines living as having a heartbeat). Because a fetal heartbeat is
normally recognized by at least eight weeks, a fetus would be considered to be
living long before it is viable which is normally recognized as 20 weeks. See
MILLER, supra note 102, at 3 (stating that "an abortion after 20 weeks is inad-
visable for medical and other reasons" and that there are alternatives avail-
able); STEDMAN, supra note 85, at 1936 (stating that a fetus normally reaches
viability at 20 gestational weeks); WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 89, at 31
(noting that fetal heart action can be detected in a fetus as young as 48 days
(seven weeks)).
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for the performance of procedures intended to kill the child.171
Thus, a statute banning partial-birth infanticide could be justi-
fied constitutionally under the traditional police powers of the
state. Partial-birth infanticide is a form of homicide-an act
performed with intent to kill a person in the process of birth. 172
Admittedly, there is some tension in concluding that par-
tial-birth infanticide bans are entirely constitutional. The ma-
jority of lower courts have struck down partial-birth abortion
statutes on grounds of vagueness or interference with a
woman's right to have an abortion, yet these statutes share the
same objective as partial birth infanticide bans.173 But the ten-
sion highlights the fact that the precise language used in the
statute is important to constitutional analysis. 17 4 Indeed, the
more carefully drafted language of partial-birth infanticide
statutes makes them more likely to serve as a model for those
states that have found their partial-birth abortion statutes in-
validated.
B. THE BENEFITS OF THE PART.L-BiRTH INFANTICIDE
APPROACH
To begin with, the partial-birth infanticide approach to
banning partial-birth procedures properly elevates the state's
interest in potential life at that point in time when the infant is
in the process of being born.175 One of the Casey plurality's
main criticisms of Roe's trimester framework was its tendency
to undervalue "the State's interest in the potential human life
within the woman."176 Casey's recognition of the state's interest
171. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
172. See Bopp & Cook, supra note 3, at 32. Any proposed partial-birth in-
fanticide ban should assure that the imposed penalty is comparable to homi-
cide penalties. See Initiative 694 § 3 (classifying a violation of the ban as a
felony); see also Planned Parenthood v. Verniero, No. CIV. 97-6170 AET, 1998
WL 849763, at *25 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 1998) (surmising that New Jersey's partial-
birth abortion act could not be intended to ban infanticide since it only im-
posed civil penalties).
173. Compare supra notes 37-39 (describing other states' partial-birth
abortion bans), with supra notes 74-81 (describing Initiative 694).
174. See Verniero, 1998 WL 849763, at *26 n.10 (noting that the legislature
could have been more precise in drafting the statute); Evans v. Kelley, 977 F.
Supp. 1283, 1319 n.38 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (suggesting that a more precisely
drafted statute would be upheld); see also supra notes 56-65 (recognizing that
courts upheld the Wisconsin statute (temporarily) and the Virginia statute be-
cause of their more precise language).
175. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
176. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 875 (1992) (plurality
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in fetal life is even stronger in the context of partial-birth pro-
cedures because the infant is no longer a potential life but an
inevitable life if not killed in the birth process. 77 Moreover, the
infant at least is removed partially from the uterus at this
stage and on its way to living a separate life independent of the
mother.1 78
In addition to highlighting the state's interest in potential
human life, classifying partial-birth procedures as infanticide
appropriately emphasizes the possible pain felt by the fetus as
a part of these procedures. There is consensus in the medical
community that from at least the twentieth week onward, the
fetal sensory organs throughout the entire body react to touch
and relay nervous impulses to the brain, triggering physiologi-
cal changes in the fetal state.179 However, there is still debate
about whether the mere fact that the fetus reacts to stimuli is
an adequate indication of fetal consciousness to pain.180 Cur-
rently, the medical evidence on fetal ability to recognize pain is
inconclusive, but a partial-birth infanticide ban would prevent
any potential cruelty which an infant killed by partial-birth in-
fanticide would undergo. 181
opinion).
177. See Initiative 694 §1(4); supra note 168.
178. See supra notes 24, 169 (noting that in the D & X procedure a fetus's
lower extremities are out of the uterus and the fetus is on its way to being a
living, completely born infant).
179. See Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 53 (letter of Watson Bowes,
M.D.) (stating that second trimester fetuses normally respond to painful stim-
uli during in utero procedures); id. at 67 (statement of Robert J. White, M.D.)
("By the 20th week of gestation and beyond, the fetus has in place the neuro-
circuitry to appreciate pain."); id. at 81 (statement of Constance S. Houck,
M.D.) (noting that sensory perception begins to develop at 7 weeks and is com-
plete by the 20th week). In fact, some studies have found that a fetus may ac-
tually be more susceptible to pain than an adult because the modulators which
suppress pain are not fully developed. See id. at 67 (statement of Robert J.
White, M.D.); Bopp & Cook, supra note 3, at 36-37.
180. See Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 225 (letter of Norig Ellison,
M.D.) (stating that "very little is known about fetal response and conscious-
ness to pain prior to 24-25 weeks gestation," but that delivered infants are
"exquisitely sensitive to pain stimulus"); idU at 249 (statement of Warren M.
Hem, M.D.) (arguing that even though "fetuses have enough neurological de-
velopment to permit certain reflexes... this is not the same as pain").
181. The evidence of fetal ability to feel pain in the second trimester would
apply to all abortion procedures, not just partial-birth procedures. See
Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463, 470 (7th Cir. 1998) (determining
that there is no basis for arguing that fetal pain of dying in the birth canal is
greater than dying in the womb); Eubanks v. Stengel, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1024,
1042 (W.D. Ky. 1998) (suggesting that a D & E would be as painful for a fetus
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Another key benefit of the partial-birth infanticide ap-
proach is that it avoids the constitutional difficulty under the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence regulating abortion. 182 Unlike
most court interpretations of partial-birth abortion statutes, a
partial-birth infanticide ban would not encompass any abortion
procedures. 183 In addition, a partial-birth infanticide ban is
likely to be more effective than a partial-birth abortion statute
that seeks to directly ban the D & X procedure because it would
be more difficult for doctors to circumvent a partial-birth infan-
ticide ban just by varying the normal procedures of the D & X
method.184 Additionally, by not implicating abortion jurispru-
dence, a partial-birth infanticide ban avoids much of the ongo-
ing uncertainty of applying Casey's undue burden test. 185
Finally, interpreting partial-birth procedures as infanticide
rather than abortion makes it easier for a court to find a ban
constitutional and grant proper deference to a law enacted by
the democratic representatives of the citizenry. 8 6 Although the
judiciary is an equal branch of our tripartite government,
courts have only a limited amount of political power. The in-
fanticide approach would allow courts to adhere to the general
rule that courts should attempt to construe statutes to avoid
constitutional difficulty if such a construction is fairly possi-
ble.187
as a partial-birth procedure); Women's Med. Profl Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F.
Supp. 1051, 1073 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (finding that testimony at the hearing
showed that a D & E abortion may also be painfil for a fetus). Thus, oppo-
nents of partial-birth procedure bans have argued that the D & X procedure is
perhaps more humane than a D & E abortion. See MacLean Massie, supra
note 13, at 354-55 & 379. However, one important distinction between D & E
abortions and partial-birth procedures is that D & E abortions are rarely per-
formed after 20 weeks. Compare supra note 15, with supra note 22. Because
fetal sensory systems have not developed completely until 20 weeks, D & E
abortions may be a less painful death. See supra note 179 and accompanying
text.
182. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
183. Compare supra notes 52-57, with supra notes 128-153.
184. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (describing some of the un-
certainty in applying Casey's undue burden test).
186. See Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1046 (W.D. Wis.
1998) (holding that a state's "attempt to ban a gruesome and less than hu-
mane procedure which physicians occasionally use to kill a child partially born
into this world must be accorded the deference it deserves"), rev'd, 162 F.3d
463 (7th Cir. 1998).
187. See e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 78
(1997) (stating that it is a cardinal principle of judicial review to construe a
statute within constitutional bounds if fairly possible); Public Citizen v.
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CONCLUSION
As the first state proposal to ban partial-birth procedures
by explicitly characterizing them as a form of infanticide rather
than abortion, Initiative 694 forged new ground. Despite the
rejection of Initiative 694 by Washington voters, its unique ap-
proach is still likely to be utilized by other states that have ei-
ther found their statutes invalidated or are just enacting par-
tial-birth procedure bans. Admittedly, partial-birth infanticide
bans and partial-birth abortion statutes share a common objec-
tive of banning procedures that extinguish the lives of par-
tially-born children. Yet, the unique and more precise lan-
guage of partial-birth infanticide bans makes it more likely
that these statutes will be found constitutional because such
bans neither infringe upon the right of a woman to choose to
have an abortion nor are they unconstitutionally vague.
United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 465-467 (1989) (adopting the rule
that a statute should be construed to avoid constitutional questions if fairly
possible); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (construing the statute to avoid con-
stitutional difficulty); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979) (re-
fusing to construe a statute as presenting a constitutional question if a differ-
ent construction is possible). Few courts addressing partial-birth abortion ban
statutes have utilized this canon to guide their interpretation of the language
of the statutes. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326,
332 (4th Cir. 1998) (criticizing the district court for not relying on the cardinal
principle that state statutes are presumed to be constitutional); Doyle, 9 F.
Supp. 2d at 1041 (emphasizing that courts should strive to construe a statute
to preserve its constitutionality).
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